Inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences
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Inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences

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Published by International Monetary Fund, Research Department in [Washington, D.C.] .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Inflation (Finance) -- Mathematical models.,
  • Anti-inflationary policies -- Mathematical models.

Book details:

Edition Notes

StatementFrancisco J. Ruge-Murcia.
GenreMathematical models.
SeriesIMF working paper -- WP/01/161
ContributionsInternational Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
The Physical Object
Pagination54 p. :
Number of Pages54
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL19365526M

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  This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss : Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia. This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations. Title: Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences - WP/01/ Created Date: 11/8/ PMAuthor: Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia. Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted by:

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones Author: Francisco.J. RUGE-MURCIA. Note that instead of the output gap we could have had the inflation rate on the horizontal axis of Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3. The asymmetric exchange rate response is robust for values of θ, ϕ, δ and λ less than and slightly greater than , , 1 and , by: 5. This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker’s preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones . investigation whereas depreciation was responded aggressively by the Bank. We call this policy stance under the inflation targeting regimes as “implicit asymmetric exchange rate peg”. The Turkish experience indicates that, as opposed to rhetoric of central banks in developing countries, inflation targeting developing countries may.

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones . This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences. Francisco Ruge-Murcia () Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, , vol. 35, issue 5, Abstract: This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. Specifically, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely Cited by: Asymmetric Behaviour of Inflation around the Target in Inflation-Targeting Emerging Markets Kurmaş Akdoğan1 Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey July Abstract: We explore the asymmetric behaviour of inflation around the target level for inflation-targeting emerging by: 1.